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This paper presents a series of experiments on discrimination in urban Lima, Peru.  
The experiments exploit degrees of information on performance as a way to 
assess how personal characteristics affect how people sort into groups, and the  
results show that behavior is not correlated with personal socio-economic and 
racial characteristics.  However, people do use personal characteristics to sort 
themselves into groups.  Height is a robust predictor of being desirable, as is 
being a woman.  Looking indigenous makes one less desirable, and looking 
“white” increases one’s desirability.  Interestingly, our experiments show that 
once information on performance is provided, almost all evidence of 
discrimination is eliminated.  Although there is evidence of stereotyping or 
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1. Introduction 
 
Trust plays an important role in our choice of personal interactions. Trust is reflected in where 
we choose to live, whom we choose to befriend, and the groups to which we belong. While many 
choices are made with information on the qualities or reputations of others, some choices may be 
made with little more information than the impressions we form by driving through a 
neighborhood or viewing the clientele of a store.  Lack of information can therefore prove a 
hindrance to economic exchange if people have misperceptions of the trustworthiness of others.  
People may withdraw from or never enter into interactions with certain segments of the 
population because of superficial perceptions, and initial perceptions might persist even in the 
face of evidence contradicting them.  In the long run, society may suffer persistent losses due to 
exclusion if enough sorting takes place. 
How important are these types of misperceptions in determining group composition and 
therefore economic outcomes?  In this study, we want to know the salience of both performance 
and observable characteristics in how people sort into groups.  We conjecture that people use 
observable characteristics, such as gender or race, to choose group members because they lack 
better information on future performance.  However, even if people use personal characteristics 
only as a way to gauge information, if performance and characteristics are highly correlated, then 
we cannot tease apart which of the two is most salient in group membership.  We use a series of 
experiments that break this correlation and allow us to assess which of the two criteria, personal 
characteristics or performance, is more salient.  More importantly, we use a cross-section of the 
population as a way to reach a more diverse subject population than is normally found in 
standard laboratory experiments with college students. 
Discrimination and social exclusion in the form of racial or ethnic discrimination seems 
to be critical in a multiracial and multilingual country as Peru, where indigenous groups and 
ethnic minorities are more likely to be poor than other groups. Previous work had shown that 
social exclusion in access to different markets—labor, credit, access to education—is a crucial 
issue in Peru. Discrimination and exclusion related to ethnicity, culture, physical appearance and 
religion take place in ways both obvious and subtle.  Moreover, and as shown by Castillo and 
Petrie (2007), using data collected from the Peruvian Truth and Reconciliation commission, 
some patterns of human rights violations are difficult to reconcile with theories of statistical 
discrimination.  If exclusion in Peru combines statistical as well as preference-based   5
discrimination, it is important to identify the extent of each and devise institutions that diminish 
both. 
Group membership may have important economic benefits, such as the benefits from 
belonging to trade associations or investment groups.  If the composition of the group dictates 
the benefits, then we may need to be careful whom we choose to be in our group or to which 
group we choose to belong; such sorting could have important consequences for which groups do 
well economically and which groups do not.  If certain groups of people are unfortunate enough 
to have, for example, weak social networks and are perceived as having an untrustworthy 
appearance, they may be excluded from groups and only be able to find membership in low 
performing groups.  Also, people conscious of discrimination might exclude themselves from 
groups as a way to avoid being discriminated against. 
We use repeated linear public goods game experiments to explore these issues.  Repeated 
public goods experiments are a natural environment in which to study trust, as they offer 
participants an opportunity to engage in reciprocal behavior.  Level of cooperation, or 
reciprocity, has been found to depend on the initial propensities people in the group have to 
cooperate (Andreoni and Petrie, 2006).  People will therefore sort themselves into groups of high 
performers.  If people are not altruistic, then trust becomes important in this environment.   
Without trust in others’ willingness to contribute to the public good, social benefits will not be 
achieved. 
Since identification of discrimination for other than statistical reasons requires breaking 
the correlation between actions and appearances, we use several experimental treatments that 
manipulate the correlation between behavior and appearances.  Subjects are shown digital 
photographs of others in the experiment and information on past performance and then asked to 
choose who they would like to have in their group.  Our approach is novel in that it manipulates 
the equilibrium at the experiment level to identify sources of discrimination.  A policy 
implication of this study is therefore to identify the changes in incentives necessary to reduce the 
prevalence of discrimination. 
Our results show that people discriminate based on appearance and socio-economic 
characteristics despite the fact that there is no correlation between those characteristics and 
performance.  That is, discrimination in urban Lima cannot be reconciled with theories of 
statistical discrimination.  While the evidence is consistent with the presence of stereotyping or   6
taste-based discrimination, we also show that providing information on previous performance 
makes evidence of discrimination disappear almost completely.  While this is encouraging, the 
results also show that there is evidence of preference-based discrimination since stereotyping is 
no longer a reasonable explanation once information on performance is revealed. 
 
2. Appearance and Information 
 
Why might we think that appearance and information will interact to affect decisions?  Previous 
research supports the notion that the social context of decisions can affect outcomes.  Research in 
experimental economics has shown that being able to identify one’s partner increases levels of 
altruism in dictator games (Bohnet and Frey, 1999; Burnham, 2003) and that cooperation in 
public goods games is increased by combining identification and information on past actions 
(Andreoni and Petrie, 2006).  Also, people may have mistaken perceptions of behavior, 
expecting women to be more trusting than they actually are (Petrie, 2004). 
Identification alone can increase cooperation, but specific characteristics of a partner, 
such as gender and beauty, can affect decisions.  People are more cooperative and trusting with 
attractive people (Andreoni and Petrie, 2006; Petrie, 2004; and Eckel and Wilson, 2002), and 
attractive people make more money (Mobius and Rosenblatt, 2005; Hammermesh and Biddle, 
1994).  Decisions are also affected by the ethnic composition (Cummings and Ferraro, 2003) and 
the gender and age composition of the experimental group (Carter and Castillo, 2003). 
Sorting or preference for individuals with certain observable characteristics may be a 
reflection of preference based or statistical based discrimination.  Previous research using audit 
studies and field experiments have shown that there is evidence for both.  Audit studies suggest 
findings consistent with preference-based discrimination (Riach and Rich, 2002), but List (2004) 
suggests that audit studies cannot distinguish this from statistical discrimination.  List uses a 
sequence of field experiments at a sports card market to show that differentiated behavior is 
more likely due to statistical discrimination than pure discrimination. 
Our experiments exploit a standard public goods game and vary one parameter to 
evaluate whether sorting is due to statistical or preference-based discrimination.  This approach 
is attractive because it relies only on the comparative static properties of the equilibrium with 
discrimination. 
   7
3. Theoretical Motivation 
 
Standard economic reasoning implies that the way people sort into groups reveals their incentive 
to form coalitions.  People will sort into the groups that maximize expected future gains, and  
observable characteristics of participants are important insofar as they reveal information on 
likely strategies to be played.  In equilibrium, people will play their best responses to the 
expected behavior of others and others’ expectations of one’s behavior.  This means that people 
will adjust their behavior according to their beliefs of what others are likely to do.   
Observable characteristics are likely to be more salient and affect play in games in the 
absence of information on the likely play of others.  This is the basis of statistical discrimination.  
Also, behavior towards others might be due to preferences for or against certain others regardless 
of beliefs.  If people have preferences for the composition of the group, how people sort into 
groups will no longer solely reflect the incentive to maximize expected future gain. 
Since one’s quality as a partner is private information, there might be incentives to signal 
quality or to obtain information on the quality of others, and people would have an incentive to 
form reputations.  In order to avoid any reputation effects we need to eliminate the incentive to 
form a reputation in early rounds of the game.   
This suggests a natural test on theories explaining sorting into groups.  Statistical discrimination 
theories suggest that appearance affects sorting only because appearance provides information on 
expected behavior.  Once information on behavior is provided, the role of appearance must be 
muted.  But what if behavior is correlated with appearances?  For example, what if Caucasians 
are indeed more cooperative?  If this is the case, then we cannot determine if sorting along social 
characteristics in the presence of information on past behavior is evidence of pure discrimination 
or statistical discrimination.  This identification problem can be resolved if this correlation can 
be broken, so that any subsequent sorting along social characteristics is due to pure 
discrimination. Our experimental design will allow us to observe if people engage in statistical 
discrimination or pure discrimination when choosing groups. 
   8
4. The Sample 
 
The proposed site for our experiments was urban metropolitan Lima in Peru. This site lends itself 
to Internet-based experiments that draw from a larger population because Internet cabins are 
common in Lima and a high proportion of the population with expertise using the internet. 
According to a survey conducted in 2003, there were 476 internet cabins distributed across all 
districts of Lima.  This amounts to around 1 computer/hour per 10 people (assuming 10 
computers per cabin, 12 hours of service and an urban population of 5,681,941 according to the 
census of 1993). This characteristic of urban Lima allows us to conduct internet-based 
experiments with non-college student populations—an important distinction, given that students 
belong to a potentially highly unrepresentative segment of the population, thus reducing the 
external validity of the results and preventing us from drawing clear policy implications.   
 
4.1 Sample Selection Procedure 
 
Our sampling strategy is consistent with the goals of the experiment. First, we want to create an 
environment in which people of various social distances who might not normally interact with 
one another can now do so Second, at the same time we want to have a sample of subjects who 
were representative of the young working population in metropolitan Lima. With these 
objectives in mind we implemented a four-step strategy.  
First, we defined eligibility criteria.  To be a subject, one must be between 20 and 35 
years of age, must live in Metropolitan Lima, must have labor market experience, must be 
currently working, must know how to use Internet and must have an e-mail account. In addition 
we sought to keep a gender and income balance so that subjects would be distributed 
homogenously across gender and income levels.  
Secondly, based on these criteria we contracted two specialized companies specializing in 
surveys and recruiting. These companies’ main assets is that they collect representative databases 
for metropolitan Lima and use local leaders to help in building the list of individuals in their 
databases, which helped to secure a diverse population in the experiments. In general, this 
mechanism ensures that the opportunity to participate in the experiment is distributed equally.  
From these databases we sampled all the potential subjects that met all of our criteria. From the 
resulting sub-sample we performed a random lottery and selected the individuals to be part of the 
experiment.    9
Thirdly, in the interest of over-sampling clusters of owners of small, medium and micro-
enterprises, we send a team of recruiters to Gamarra (an industrial area in metropolitan Lima). 
The advantage of Gamarra was two-fold. First, we had a pre-census of all the establishments in 
Gamarra, which allowed us to randomly select buildings from which we invited subjects. 
Second, it is one of the biggest clusters of small and medium enterprises (SMEs) in metropolitan 
Lima and represents a rich mix of population in terms of place of origin and socio-economic 
background.  According to the census of 1993, 37 percent of the population of La Victoria 
(where Gamarra is located) consisted of migrants.  Moreover, the patterns of migration are 
diverse, allowing us to sample from a diverse population. 
The procedure followed to select the establishments within Gamarra consisted of the 
following protocol. First, based on the pre-census, we identified the blocks with the highest 
concentration of commercial buildings, which consisted of three long blocks (approximately 8 
standard 100mt blocks) crossed by three transversal blocks. Second, we visited four commercial 
buildings per block, randomly selecting one building on that block and three buildings to its left 
or right. Third, within the buildings we selected establishments by performing a random lottery 
from the total number of establishments in each odd-numbered level of the building. Fourth, we 
invited one person in the establishment to participate in the experiment. 
Finally, to be representative of subjects of university age and that are part of the 
university system, we also invited potential subjects that were taking classes at extension 
institutes within the major universities located in metropolitan Lima, which have student bodies 
that represent very diverse socio-economic backgrounds.  In addition, this group of students from 
the extension institutes is different from college students in the sense that they are already 
working and do not necessarily have a college degree. Recruitment of subjects in all of these 
sites followed standard experimental recruitment protocols. 
It is important to note that because our experiments rely on Internet protocols and the 
knowledge of using a computer, we will likely exclude some segments of the population that 
might suffer more marked patterns of discrimination. Therefore it is important to recognize that 
our initial results will therefore give a lower bound estimate to the extent of discrimination. Even 
so, the Internet protocols used were simple enough as to include large segments of the 
population.  Previous experience by the researchers in rural areas in South Africa and Central 
America show that illiterate subjects are able to understand experimental procedures presented in   10
a graphical manner. The experiments in this research required simply that the subjects know how 
to use a computer mouse. 
 
 
4.2 Comparison of Sample to Metropolitan Lima Population 
 
Map 1 give a first approximation of the distribution of the selected subjects across metropolitan 
Lima. According to the population census of 1993, our sample essentially covers most of the 
districts in Metropolitan Lima and is highly correlated with the distribution of the population 
with complete or incomplete higher education. 
 
 
Map 1. Distribution of the Sample in Comparison with the Population 
with Complete or Incomplete Higher Education in the Population Census of 1993 
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To investigate the representativeness of our sample, we used the 2004 Encuesta Nacional 
de Hogares (ENAHO) and compiled from it a sub-sample that meets the same eligibility criteria 
as our subjects. The advantage of using the ENAHO as a comparison group is that it is 
representative of Metropolitan Lima and therefore could help us identify any selection bias in our 
sample. Table 1 presents the results of comparing our sample and ENAHO 2004 for a subset of 
variables common to our survey and to the ENAHO. Both samples have a similar distribution 
among almost all the variables, although our sample is slightly more educated and had 
significantly fewer migrants than the ENAHO. This is most likely a reflection of the requirement 
in our sample that subjects know how to use the Internet. Nonetheless, the age, gender, monthly 
income, average education, household size, and characteristics of the household are very similar. 
This comparison gives us confidence that our sample is a reasonable representation of the larger 
population in metropolitan Lima.   12
Table 1. Comparing Our Sample with ENAHO 2004 
 




Level of education 
2/.
Incomplete non-university tertiary 14.6% 24.6%
Complete non-university tertiary 17.5% 36.2%
Incomplete university tertiary 35.0% 20.0%
Complete university tertiary 32.8% 19.2%










Weekly hours of work 
5/. 35.4 44.7
Monthly income 
5/. 6/. 1087.3 1099.2
Health insurance 
7/. 63.3% 40.3%
Affiliation to pension fund 37.6% 50.8%
Members of household 4.9 5.1
15 years or younger 0.7 0.9
65 year or older 0.4 0.3
Working people in household 2.50 2.54
Rooms in dwelling
One room 3.2% 4.0%
Two rooms 10.1% 8.7%
Three rooms 27.2% 19.1%
Four rooms 17.7% 25.0%
Five rooms 15.2% 15.2%
Six rooms 10.8% 10.2%
Seven or more rooms 15.8% 17.7%
1/. Estimations for ENAHO 2004 have been limited to observations with the following characteri
(a) residence in Metropolitan Lima; (b) 20-35 years old; (c) working at the time of the survey;
(d) with more than complete secondary education.
2/. Some respondents in the sample reported less than complete secondary education and have bee
excluded from schooling-related estimations.
3/. This information is only available for the III and IV Quarter Rounds of ENAHO 2004.
4/. Migrants are defined as those not born in Lima. 
5/. Some respondents in the sample reported they were not working at the time of the survey and
have been excluded from labor-related estimations.
6/. In constant soles of May 2006.
7/. EsSalud or private health insurance.    13
The sample of individuals for this study was composed of self-employed or dependent 
workers from the high, middle and lower-income classes of metropolitan Lima. They were 
relatively young, 23 years old on average, and most had some kind of higher education. The 
average number of years of schooling was 14.6, with a standard deviation of 1.9, and close to 70 
percent of the sample had complete or incomplete university studies. Only 20 percent of 
individuals graduated from a public school, while 45 percent graduated from a private religious 
high school. Although 45 percent of subjects’ fathers and 27 percent of their mothers had 
finished university studies, their parents’ education was on average lower than their own.  All 
subjects had some labor experience, and 98 percent had worked during the last 12 months.  More 
than two-thirds of the applicants were males. Family and per capita income were generally 
higher for those individuals who attended high school at a private institution, had undertaken 
technical or professional studies at a university and whose parents had achieved post-secondary 
diplomas, whether at universities or vocational institutions.  
With regard to asset ownership, we found that most subjects live in dwellings with more 
than two rooms, and 40 percent of the sample lives in dwellings of five or more rooms. Although 
the sample of applicants for our study was drawn from a specific segment of the population of 
Metropolitan Lima that had relatively homogeneous schooling, experience and age. Nonetheless, 
we found a high dispersion in earnings among the subjects and their households, which assured 
that they belonged to different socioeconomic levels. 
 
5. Experimental Design 
 
We use a linear public goods game to explore discrimination in group formation. Each subject is 
given a 25-token endowment and must decide how to divide the endowment between a private 
investment and a public investment. Each token placed in the private investment yields a return 
of 4 céntimos to the subject.
1 Each token placed in the public investment yields a return of αi to 
the subject and every other member of the group; the return to the public investment varies 
across treatments and will be explained later. There are 20 subjects in each experimental session. 
Subjects are randomly assigned to a five-person group and play 10 rounds with that same group. 
At the end of each round, subjects learn their payoff, πi, and the total number of tokens 
contributed to the public investment by the group, G. In total, subjects play three 10-round 
                                                 
1 There are 100 céntimos in 1 sol (the Peruvian currency). At the time of the study, US$1 = 3.2 soles.   14
sequences, and each 10-round sequence is with the same group. At the end of the first 10-round 
sequence, subjects are again randomly assigned to a new five-person group, and at the end of the 
second 10-round sequence, subjects are asked to choose their group for the final 10 investment 
decisions. Subjects do not know they will be asked to choose their group before this point in the 
experiment. 
In order to create an incentive for people to reveal their preferences, we created the 
following procedure. Subjects rank all other subjects from most preferred to least preferred, and 
we provide subjects with some information on the other subjects in the room to use for ranking. 
The information is either the average amount contributed to the public investment during the 
second 10-round sequence, the subject’s photo, or both. Subjects use that information to create a 
list from most preferred to least preferred. Digital photographs of subjects are taken at the 
beginning of the experiment, and those photographs are head shots, similar to a passport or 
identification photo. 
Once all subjects submit their lists, groups are formed in four steps. First, one person is 
chosen at random. A group is formed that includes the randomly chosen person and the top four 
people on his list. Second, one person from the remaining 15 people who have not been assigned 
to a group is randomly chosen. A group is formed with that person and the first four people on 
that person’s list from the remaining people who have not been previously assigned to a group. 
Third, one person from the remaining 10 people who have not been previously assigned to a 
group is randomly chosen. The first four people on that persons list among the remaining people 
are put in a group with that person. Fourth, anyone not already assigned to a group is put in a 
group together. Subjects then see a screen with the information corresponding to the subjects in 
their new group. Subjects play the last 10 rounds with that group. 
This mechanism is similar to the one suggested in Bogomolnaia and Jackson (2002). The 
mechanism is incentive compatible if preferences over groups are additive in the preferences 
over its members. Additivity in this context means that if James prefers Jill’s company to Jane’s 
company, then James always prefers a group that exchanges Jane for Jill, regardless of who the 
other members of the group are. Under these conditions, revealing the ordering of others is a 
weakly dominant strategy for James. If James is not chosen, he is indifferent in the ranking he 
reveals, but if he is chosen, he is better off by revealing his true rankings. Since preferences over 
others’ company are additive, it does not matter whether he is chosen first or last.   15
Additivity of preferences over others’ company may be a strong assumption, as some 
combinations of people might be less successful than others. For instance, some women might be 
very cooperative with other women but less so with men. Likwise, a woman might be chosen to 
be part of a group when other women are available, but not when mostly men are available. 
The mechanism described above is incentive compatible, regardless of the preferences 
over groups, if people are able to rank all possible groups that one could be paired with. 
Unfortunately, this option would be impractical since the number of groups to be ranked would 
be exceedingly large. For this reason, we opted for the mechanism described above because it is 
easy to explain to subjects and can be implemented quickly once subjects have submitted their 
lists of rankings. 
There are four experimental treatments: Contribution Only, Photo Only, Contribution and 
Photo, and Two Types. Treatments differ in the αi assigned to each person and the information 
that is shown to subjects when they are asked to rank the other subjects. 
In the Contribution Only, Photo Only and Contribution and Photo treatments, all subjects 
are assigned an αi =2 céntimos, so the price of contributing to the public good is 2. It is in the 
group’s interest for everyone to contribute their full endowment to the public investment, but 
each individual in the group maximizes payoffs by putting all his tokens in the individual 
investment. In the Contribution Only treatment, when subjects are asked to rank others, they see 
the average amount contributed to the public good in the second 10-round sequence by all other 
subjects in the room. In the Photo Only treatment, subjects see the photos of all other subjects, 
while in the Contribution and Photo treatment, subjects see the photo and the average amount 
contributed to the public good in the second 10-round sequence. The average is listed below each 
subject’s photo. 
In the Two Types treatment, αi∈{0.5, 5.0} céntimos. Half of the subjects are randomly 
assigned a value of 0.5 and half are randomly assigned a value of 5.0, and subjects keep the same 
value for all 30 rounds of play. A subject with an αi =5.0 has a price of contributing to the public 
good of 0.8 and should invest his entire endowment in the public good. A subject with an αi =0.5 
has a price of contributing to the public good of 8, so investing in the public good is very 
expensive. We would expect subjects assigned the low value to invest little to nothing in the 
public good.   16
Each treatment was run twice, and each experimental session had 20 subjects. An 
experimental session lasted at least two hours. In total, 160 subjects participated in the four 
treatments. Each session ended with an extensive post-questionnaire. Subjects were recruited 
from diverse neighborhoods in Lima, Peru. The experiments were conducted on computers in 
two computer labs at the University of the Pacific in Lima, Peru. Since most subjects worked full 
time, the experiments were conducted on weekend afternoons. Sixty percent of the subjects are 
men, and subjects ranged in age from 20-30 years old, with an average age of 26.3 years 
(standard deviation 4.2 years). More descriptive statistics on the subjects are in the Results 
section. Race, beauty and height classifications are discussed in the following section. 
In the Contribution Only, Photo Only, and Contribution and Photo treatments, average 
payoffs are $19.65 (standard deviation $1.36). In the Two Types treatment, average payoffs are 
$33.75 (standard deviation $6.87). 
 
6. Race, Beauty and Height Classifications 
 
We are interested in knowing if people sort into groups based on physical characteristics. While 
a person’s sex is easy to determine, a person’s race and beauty are not. We want to develop an 
independent measure of the race and beauty of a person that reflects the general perception of 
that person. Therefore, we use raters, people who did not participate in the public goods 
experiment but who are drawn from the same cohort as subjects in the experiment, to rate the 
photos of the subjects in terms of race and beauty, as well as height. A rater only rated the photo 
in terms of one characteristic, race, beauty or height, and not all three. 
For race ratings, because the most popular self-classification of race in Peru is mestizo 
(mixed race), it is important for us to have a measure of race that can adequately capture this 
mixing. For this reason, we use the race classification method developed by Torero et al. (2004) 
and Nopo et al (2004). Instead of classifying a subject along one dimension of “white” or 
“mestizo,” we evaluate subjects in their racial intensity in four categories: white, indigenous, 
black and Asian, which are readily recognized as distinct racial groups. This gives a more 
nuanced measure of race and more accurately captures racial mixing in Peru. 
To obtain these ratings, we had 20 non-participants in the public goods experiment (10 
women and 10 men), not involved in the public goods experiment, rate each subject along each 
of these four dimensions. Each dimension was rated from zero to 10, with zero being complete   17
absence of the dimension and 10 being the most intense. Raters were instructed to choose 
whichever number between one and 10 best described the person for each of the four racial 
dimensions. The four numbers did not need to add up to 10. The raters were also told that if they 
thought that a person belonged to only one racial group, then that person should be given a 10 for 
that racial dimension and a zero for all other dimensions. Raters were shown the photos one by 
one on a computer screen and chose the intensity of each dimension by clicking on a button. 
Raters could easily move back and forth between the photos to check or change their answers. 
Ratings took about one hour, and each rater was paid $9.67 for their time. 
For the beauty ratings, we followed the same procedure as with the race ratings. The only 
difference is that the ten men and ten women were asked to rate each photo in terms of physical 
attractiveness. The scale went from one to nine, with one being not at all attractive and nine 
being very attractive. Raters were asked to choose the number that best described that person’s 
physical attractiveness to them.  
For the height guess, we followed the same procedure as with the race and beauty ratings. 
The only difference is that the 10 men and 10 women were asked to guess the height, in 
centimeters, of each person in the photo. Raters were free to choose any number for the height.  
In terms of agreement among raters, there was usually a high degree of agreement in 
terms of each racial dimension. Along the white dimension, pairwise correlations among raters 
ranged from 0.31-0.76, with an average of 0.57. For the indigenous dimension, correlations 
ranged from 0.02-0.64, with an average of 0.41. For the black dimension, correlations ranged 
from 0.19-0.82, with an average of 0.50, and for the Asian dimension, correlations ranged from -
0.02-0.81, with an average of 0.37.
2  
While the rating scale ranged from zero to ten for race and one to nine for beauty, some 
raters did not use the full range of the scale. For example, for race, some used intensities up to 10 
and some only up to six. To be able to make comparisons across raters, we standardize each 
rater’s rating by her own mean and standard deviation. This permits us to take an average across 
all twenty raters’ standardized ratings for race, beauty or height to obtain the final ratings we use 
to analyze the data.  
                                                 
2 The Cronback alpha for interrater reliability is another measure of agreement among raters. For the white 
dimension, the coefficient is 0.9565; for the indigenous dimension, the coefficient is 0.9285; for the black 
dimension, the coefficient is 0.9451; and for the Asian dimension, the coefficient is 0.9113.   18
For race, the most likely intensities in the subject population are white and indigenous. 
While there are some subjects that display intensities in the dimensions of black and Asian, the 
majority of subjects display the greatest intensities in the dimensions of white and indigenous. 
This is in line with the general population in Peru, where blacks make up 2 percent of the 
population and Asians make up 3 percent of the population. Average intensity is 2.83 for white, 
3.91 for indigenous, 1.89 for black, and 1.31 for Asian. 
Because the majority of our subjects identified themselves primarily as a mix of white 
and indigenous, we concentrate on these two dimensions in our analysis of contributions and 
ranking in the next section. 
 
6. Results and Discussion 
 
Table 2 present descriptive statistics of the experimental subjects.
3  Three out of five subjects are 
men, and the average age is 26 years. As mentioned in the sample description section, our 
sample is slightly more educated than the population at large.  On average, participants have 
three or more years of post-secondary education, and 29 percent have a college degree.  The 
sample also reflects the different ethnic and cultural background of Lima’s population.  Sixteen 
percent of the sample has at least one grandparent whose mother tongue was neither Spanish nor 
any other Peruvian indigenous languages.  Thirty percent of the sample has at least one parent 
whose mother tongue was indigenous to Peru.  While stature is a self-reported variable, we find 
great variation in height.  On average, a male subject reports being 1.73 meters tall and a female 
subject reports being 1.63 meters tall.  Finally, experimental subjects live in household with an 
average of five persons. 
 
                                                 
3 There are three post-experiment surveys missing from the sample   19
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics 
 
       
Variables N  Mean  S.D.  Min  Max 
       
1[Men] 160  0.61  0.49  0  1 
Age (years)  160  26.28  4.23  20  35 
Education (years)  160  15.07  1.72  10  19 
1[college degree]  160  0.29  0.46  0  1 
1[inc. college degree]  160  0.32  0.47  0  1 
European Grandparents (n)  157
1 0.17 0.60 0  4 
Indigenous Grandparents (n)  157
1 0.31 0.89 0  4 
Height  (meters)  160  1.69 0.08 1.52 1.94 
Family Size  156
1 4.95 2.24 1  13 
1[Religious High School]  160  0.44  0.50  0  1 
          
         1 There are three missing post-experiment questionnaires from the sample. 
 
6.1 What Did People Do in the Experiment? 
 
Figures 1 and 2 show the aggregate behavior in all experimental sessions.  Across all rounds of 
the first sequence of the experiment, contributions to the public good range from 23 percent of 
subjects’ endowment for low types in the Two Types treatment to 46 percent of subjects’ 
endowments in Contribution Only.  As it is commonly observed (see Kagel and Roth, 1995), 
contributions tend to decline with time.  Contributions decline to 9 percent for low types in the 
Two Types treatment and to 27 percent in Contribution Only.  A similar pattern is observed in 
the second sequence of the experiment in Figure 2.  Contributions in the first round of the second 
sequence of the experiment range from 30 percent in Contribution Only to 46 percent for low 
types in Two Types.  Contributions in the last round of the second sequence decrease to 14 
percent in Photo Only and to 32 percent for low types in Two Types. 
The figures also show that the incentives of the Two Types treatment successfully induce 
a separation in behavior between high and low types.  High types contribute 50 percentage points 
more to the public good than low types.  Moreover, the figures also show convergence towards 
play of dominant strategies by high types. 
   20
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A basic premise in theories of statistical discrimination is that people of different 
backgrounds might behave differently and therefore, in the absence of better information, ethnic 
or cultural background can be used as a proxy of behavior.  For instance, migrants might 
experience unfavorable market conditions, causing them to behave selfishly. Conversely, more 
affluent subjects can afford to be more altruistic or take more risks.  Table 3 shows a series of 
regressions aimed at determining if different people do behave differently.  All regressions 
include group-level fixed effects in order to control for the fact that different levels of 
contributions might be observed due to social interactions within a particular group.  The 
regressions also include random effects at the individual level to control for the fact that the same 
person’s decisions are correlated.
4 
 
Table 3. Percent of Endowment Contributed to the Public Good 
(Sequence 2) 
 
      
Variables Contribution 
Only, Photo Only, 
and Contribution 
and Photo 
Two Types  All Treatments 
 
1[Men]  4.62 (0.21) -3.03 (0.75) 3.19 (0.37)
Age (years)  0.10 (0.78) -0.81 (0.40) -0.13 (0.70)
Education (years)  0.55 (0.56) -2.74 (0.14) -0.57 (0.51)
Height (meters)  -1.56 (0.95) 117.36 (0.03) 27.78 (0.21)
1[White>Med, Indig.≤ Med]  -0.16 (0.96) -2.90 (0.74) -0.96 (0.77)
1[White≤Med, Indig.> Med]  -1.55 (0.68) 4.09 (0.70) -0.30 (0.94)
1[Religious High School]  -1.72 (0.58) 5.99 (0.48) 1.16 (0.70)
1[Low Type]  - - -13.44 (0.72)
1[High Type]  - 48.01 (0.00) 30.37 (0.42)
Round  -1.19 (0.00) -0.12 (0.73) -0.93 (0.00)
Constant  26.49 (0.51) -113.41 (0.19) -
Individual Random Effects  Yes Yes Yes
Group Fixed Effects  Yes Yes Yes
Within-R2 0.0360 0.0003 0.0209
N 1200 400 1600
p-values in parentheses       
        
                                                 
4 Results are robust to different specifications.   22
The regressions in Table 3 show that behavior is not correlated with personal 
characteristics.  On average, contributions decrease by 10 percent from round 1 to round 10.  
There is a slight effect of taller people giving more in the Two Types treatment. It is further 
interesting to compare the column showing results from the combination of the Contribution 
Only, Photo Only, and Contribution and Photo treatments and the column showing the results for 
all treatments.  The regressions show that even when the relative cost of contributing was higher 
for low types in the Two Types treatment than in other treatments they contributed 27 percentage 
points more.  Since high types in the Two Types treatment contribute 71 percentage points more 
than in other treatments, this evidence is consistent with theories of reciprocity and peer effects. 
Table 3 shows that personal characteristics are of little help in predicting others’ 
behavior.  This result will be useful in interpreting the results in the following section. It is 
important to note that ethnic background, as measure as intensity of a racial characteristic, is not 
correlated with behavior at all. 
 
6.2 How Were People Ranked? 
 
The previous section shows that there is little evidence supporting the hypothesis that personal 
characteristics correlate with behavior.  This section investigates if personal characteristics are 
used when choosing groups.  The regression is based on a few covariates due to the fact that 
results are not altered significantly by the addition of additional ones.  Ethnicity is measured by 
the average standardized intensity variable of white and indigenous described in the section on 
Race Classification.  We use these aggregated racial intensities to create a discrete variable 
determining if a person is white or indigenous.  A person is considered white if her average of 
racial intensity ratings in the white dimension is above the median and her average racial 
intensity ratings in the indigenous dimension is below the median.  A person is considered 
indigenous if her average racial intensity in the indigenous dimension is above the median and 
her average racial intensity in the white dimension is below the median. 
Table 4 reports the OLS regression for rankings separately for each treatment.
5  The 
dependent variable is the rank that a person is given.  That is, a person with a rank of 1 is rank 
highest and a person with a rank of 19 is rank lowest.  Given the way rank is defined, the 
                                                 
5 The results in Table 4 and Table 5 are similar if using rank-ordered logit or if we use robust standard errors. Note 
that the reported results do not use robust standard errors.  The results are also similar if we use racial intensities of 
trained raters.   23
interpretation of the sign of coefficients must be adjusted accordingly.  If a coefficient is positive 
then the variable associated with it tends to lower one’s rank.  If a coefficient is negative the 
presence of the covariate tends to improve one’s rank. 
There are two covariates that require extra explanation.  Expected Rank is a variable 
indicating the rank that a person should have if only contributions to the public good are used to 
rank others.  The expected coefficient on this variable should be 1 if information on others’ 
behavior is the only relevant information in creating ranks. 
 
Table 4. OLS Regression on Individual Ranking 
(highest = 1, lowest = 19) 
 
      
Variables Photo  Only  Contribution 
& Photo 
Two Types 
      
Age (years)  0.06 (0.28)  0.03 (0.32)  -0.02 (0.67) 
1[Man]  2.89 (0.00)  0.09 (0.81)  -0.00 (0.99) 
Height (meters)  -10.37 (0.00)  -0.85 (0.65)  -1.10 (0.66) 
Expected Rank  -  0.83 (0.00)  0.64 (0.00) 
1[White > Med & Indig. ≤ Med]  0.19 (0.73)  -0.06 (0.86)  -0.71 (0.14) 
1[White ≤ Med & Indig. > Med]  1.47 (0.00)  -0.34 (0.28)  -0.19 (0.68) 
Constant  23.48 (0.00)  2.30 (0.46)  6.17 (0.13) 
R2 0.05  0.70  0.43 
N 760  760  760 
 
People seem to understand that having high contributors in the group is the best strategy.  
For instance, Expected Rank alone explains 67 percent of the variance of ranks in Contribution 
Only (not shown in Table 4).  Expected Rank remains a strong predictor of rank in all treatments 
where information on previous contribution is provided. 
Interestingly, despite the fact that personal characteristics have no bearing on what people 
do in the experiment, they tend to predict the way people are ranked.  In the Photo Only 
treatment, men are ranked on average 2.4 ranks lower than women.  Height also has a strong 
effect on the way people are ranked: 10 extra centimeters of height increases rank by one.  Tall 
women are therefore ranked rather high.  Due to the fact that people only saw the picture of other 
participants, the result on height is puzzling.  Height might be correlated with other 
characteristics captured in a photo and might therefore not measure the impact of height per se.  
However, as mentioned before, we collected data from independent people to check if people we   24
able to correctly guess the height of others by looking at head-shot pictures.  Indeed, the average 
guessed height reported by independent raters is highly correlated with real height even after 
controlling for sex and ethnicity.  That is, we cannot discard the hypothesis that height itself 
explains how people are ranked. 
Relevant for the question of racial discrimination, the regression on rankings made in 
Photo Only also shows that people that look indigenous are ranked 1.47 ranks lower.  Table 4, 
however, shows that discrimination based on race is present only when no information on past 
performance is available.  Rankings made in the treatment with Contributions and Photos show 
that race indicators are no longer significant.  That is, the regressions are consistent with 
stereotyping but not preference-based discrimination. 
 
 
Table 5. OLS Regression on Individual Ranking 
(highest = 1, lowest = 19) 
     
Variables  Photo Only  Contribution & Photo  Two Types 
  Men Women  Men Women  Men  Women 
Age (years)  0.06 (0.31)  0.04 (0.63)  0.01 (0.68)  0.08 (0.22)  0.07 (0.21)  -0.10 (0.03) 
1[Man]  2.76 (0.00)  3.12 (0.00)  0.05 (0.89)  0.07 (0.93)  0.26 (0.69)  -0.25 (0.62) 
Height (meters)  -9.17 (0.03)  -12.56 (0.03)  -1.08 (0.75)  0.41 (0.92)  -2.95 (0.46)  0.79 (0.80) 
Expected Rank  -  -  0.86 (0.00)  0.73 (0.00)  0.55 (0.00)  0.73 (0.00) 
1[White > Med & 
Indig. ≤ Med] 
0.39 (0.58)  -0.23 (0.81)  -0.11 (0.75)  0.12 (0.86)  -1.09 (0.16)  -0.41 (0.49) 
1[White  ≤ Med & 
Indig. > Med] 
1.84 (0.00)  0.74 (0.42)  0.01 (0.97)  1.34 (0.06)  -0.42 (0.56)  -0.03 (0.96) 
Constant  21.06 (0.00)  27.85 (0.00)  2.93 (0.39)  -0.53 (0.94)  7.96 (0.22)  4.27 (0.66) 
R2 0.05  0.04  0.74  0.61  0.32  0.55 
N 494  266  551  209  361  399 
 
Who is doing the discriminating? Table 5 shows how men and women rank others. In 
Photo Only, both men and women rank tall women higher, but it is men who rank people who 
look indigenous lower. Women react more strongly to tall women than men. In Contribution and 
Photo, women rank people who look indigenous lower. Men do not react to racial characteristics. 
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Table 6. OLS Regression on Individual Ranking 
(highest = 1, lowest = 19) 
      
Variables  Photo Only  Contribution & Photo  Two Types 
  White Indigenous  White  Indigenous White Indigenous
Age (years)  0.03 (0.71)  0.13 (0.13)  0.02 (0.55)  -0.01 (0.87)  0.10 (0.04)  -0.09 (0.12) 
1[Man]  4.08 (0.00)  2.58 (0.00)  0.73 (0.07)  -0.01 (0.99)  -0.12 (0.82)  0.40 (0.56) 
Height (meters)  -10.89 (0.07)  -11.99 (0.03)  -2.07 (0.31)  -0.32 (0.93)  -2.60 (0.45)  1.71 (0.67) 
Expected Rank  -  -  0.92 (0.00)  0.73 (0.00)  0.80 (0.00)  0.69 (0.00) 
1[White > Med & 
Indig. ≤ Med] 
-0.63 (0.51)  1.20 (0.18)  -0.35 (0.27)  0.25 (0.70)  -0.42 (0.52)  -1.39 (0.07) 
1[White  ≤ Med & 
Indig. > Med] 
1.97 (0.03)  0.91 (0.28)  0.21 (0.56)  0.83 (0.19)  -0.09 (0.88)  -0.53 (0.48) 
Constant  24.21 (0.00)  24.43 (0.00)  3.28 (0.33)  3.16 (0.62)  3.73 (0.50)  3.33 (0.66) 
R2 0.12  0.03  0.90  0.54  0.68  0.48 
N 247  304  228  266  228  266 
 
Table 6 shows how White and Indigenous people rank others. Both groups rate tall 
women higher, but only Whites rate indigenous-looking people lower. When information on 
contributions is known, this is a strong predictor of rank. Whites do rank men lower in 
Contribution and Photo, and they also rank older people lower in Two Types.  But this effect is 
rather small. 
Tables 7 and Table 8 show OLS regressions that further investigates the presence of 
discrimination across treatments.
6  Table 7 shows a linear probability model on the likelihood of 
being in the top four of any list.  As mentioned above being a man decreases the probability of 
being among the top four and height increases the probability of being among the top four. Table 
8 shows the likelihood of being in the bottom 4 of any list. Both of these tables confirm previous 
results. 
 
                                                 
6 The results in Tables 6 through 8 are similar if we use probit or robust standard errors.   26
Table 7. Probability of Being in the Top 4 
(highest = 1, lowest = 19) 
 
      
Variables Photo  Only  Contribution 
& Photo 
Two Types 
      
Age (years)  -0.01 (0.14)  -0.00 (0.39)  0.00 (0.21) 
1[Man]  -0.17 (0.00)  -0.02 (0.57)  0.05 (0.18) 
Height (meters)  0.60 (0.02)  -0.19 (0.27)  -0.19 (0.32) 
Expected to be in Group  -  0.68 (0.00)  0.52 (0.00) 
1[White > Med & Indig. ≤ Med]  -0.00 (0.92)  0.00 (0.97)  0.15 (0.00) 
1[White ≤ Med & Indig. > Med]  -0.11 (0.00)  0.02 (0.61)  0.04 (0.27) 
Constant  -0.49 (0.22)  0.43 (0.14)  0.20 (0.50) 
R2 0.04  0.52  0.34 
N 760  760  760 
 
 
Table 8. Probability of Being in the Bottom 4 
(highest = 1, lowest = 19) 
 
      
Variables Photo  Only  Contribution 
& Photo 
Two Types 
      
Age (years)  -0.00 (0.72)  0.01 (0.01)  -0.01 (0.01) 
1[Man]  0.14 (0.00)  -0.04 (0.24)  0.02 (0.58) 
Height (meters)  -0.62 (0.02)  -0.03 (0.86)  -0.34 (0.12) 
Expected to be in Group  -  0.74 (0.00)  0.48 (0.00) 
1[White > Med & Indig. ≤ Med]  0.13 (0.00)  0.09 (0.00)  0.01 (0.72) 
1[White ≤ Med & Indig. > Med]  0.15 (0.00)  0.12 (0.00)  0.08 (0.05) 
Constant  1.10 (0.01)  -0.14 (0.59)  0.82 (0.01) 
R2 0.03  0.63  0.28 
N 760  760  760 
 
 
Finally, note the results for the Two Types treatment.  This treatment is interesting 
because subjects are induced to behave quite differently regardless of their looks or background.  
Despite this, we find that looking white increases the likelihood of being named among the top 
four.  Also, looking indigenous increases the likelihood of being named among the bottom four. 
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7. Conclusions and Policy Implications 
 
We present a series of experiments aimed at determining the nature of discrimination in urban 
Lima, Peru.  Subjects play a linear public goods game and are allowed to sort into groups. Our 
experiments systematically manipulate the information available about others when sorting into 
groups. This allows us to examine what is more relevant to group formation, information on past 
performance or physical characteristics. We recruited a diverse sample of individuals currently 
working in the labor market to participate in the experiments.   
Our experiments show that subject behavior is not correlated with personal 
characteristics, including ethnicity and socio-economic standing. That is, our results show that 
there is little room for statistical theories of discrimination.  However, our experiments show that 
people do use the personal characteristics of others when given the opportunity to choose 
partners.  Our research shows evidence of preference-based discrimination or stereotyping.  
Interestingly, our experiments also show that evidence of discrimination or stereotyping vanishes 
almost completely once information on others’ behavior is provided. 
Nonetheless, subjects tend to prefer groups of tall people, women, and white-looking 
people.  While evidence of discrimination is almost completely eliminated by revealing 
information on others’ behavior, there is still evidence that race is an important factor even when 
information is revealed.  Intriguingly, while tall women are preferred in the absence of 
information, they are less likely to be selected for the top ranks when information is revealed.  
The effect of race, however, seems to be constant.  This effect even survives when subjects are 
given incentives that make their behavior orthogonal to their personal characteristics. 
The fact that not everyone uses others’ characteristics in ranking in the same way 
provides further evidence of stereotyping or taste-based discrimination.  While there is 
agreement across genders and ethnicities that taller people and women are more desirable 
partners, the effect of race on rankings is basically explained by the behavior of men and white 
participants.  Since our experiments show that discrimination can be erased when information on 
performance is available, we conclude that these results are expression of prejudice. 
Our research has some important policy implications.  People seem to have 
preconceptions of the behavior of others that create a barrier to access.  That is, if people are 
excluded based on their appearance, those being excluded are denied the opportunity of showing 
what they are capable of doing.  Given that once information is revealed most discrimination   28
goes away, it seems that it would recommendable to create opportunities for people to interact.  
While our experiments show that information on others’ performance is quite useful in solving 
initial stereotypes, it is clear that in practical terms it is difficult to provide precise and reliable 
measures of one’s performance.  That is, it is not clear that policymakers have the tools to make 
signals clearer or to make measurement of performance in the work place better.  It is also 
entirely possible that, while discrimination in the work place is diminished through public 
intervention, other avenues such as marriage or neighborhood sorting survive.  
Overall, our research shows that carefully designed experiments can allow us to identify 
the nature of discrimination.   29
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